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5. The South Sumatran military command has banned the activities of the PKI and its mass affiliates. Eleven of Indonesia's seventeen military areas have now taken such action.

6. The US Embassy in Djakarta has a report that Marshal Dani, who "temporarily" stepped down from his duties as air force commander and left the country on a purchasing mission, has unexpectedly returned to Indonesia under escort, and is now in army hands in Djakarta. Earlier, rumors have circulated that the army did not allow Dani to depart at all but placed him under detention.

7. President Sukarno is continuing to oppose the army's anti-Communist campaign. According to Information Minister Achmadi, Sukarno told a meeting of leaders of seven Indonesian political parties yesterday that a switch to the right "would be a calamity even greater than the 30 September incident."

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OCI No. 2778/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
24 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #40 -- As of 4:00 PM EDT)

1. First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, who is also Foreign Minister, made his first major political statement at the 23 October meeting of regional officials in Djakarta. His speech, like President Sukarno's, was clearly directed at undercutting the army's political assertiveness and its anti-Communist campaign.

2. He alluded to accusations that he himself was involved in the 30 September plot, but pointed out that he had been in North Sumatra in the company of a high ranking army officer when he heard news of the coup. He asserted that he could "never become an opportunist" and had so pledged to President Sukarno. Subandrio noted that elements of the armed forces as well as of the Communist Party were involved in the coup. He said that there are indications that several newspapers now being published are financed by CIA.

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6. Possibly an indication of the drift of power in Sukarno's favor is the statement of the Information Minister on 23 October that the press situation is "not yet satisfactory." He called on journalists throughout Indonesia to conduct a joint "introspection and correction." He said that in the near future he would review the existing press and take measures for the purpose of "screening and bringing order." Control of information media was returned last week from the army to the Ministry of Information. Under army management the press had developed a marked anti-Communist posture.

7. Two more army regional commands have banned the activities of the Communist Party (PKI) and its affiliates. Nine of the 17 commands have now taken this action. In several areas, the ban is accompanied by an order that leaders of the party and its front organizations register with the police.

8. Sukarno will leave shortly for Algiers and later will go to Vienna presumably for medical treatment. Subandrio's departure early in the week, apparently for Algiers, seems to be firm.

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9. If Sukarno should leave Indonesia also, this would seem to indicate that he feels considerable confidence in his own position. In the past, he has frequently left the country after a crisis apparently in order to let the dust settle and to evaluate from a distance how to proceed.

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OCI No. 2817

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
20 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #36 - As of 4:00 P.M. EDT)

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2. The army, however, is continuing its anti-Communist action. Arrests of Communist officials have continued, including those who came out of hiding to attend the Anti-Foreign Military Bases Conference, as well as leaders of the Communist-controlled and once powerful Indonesian Journalist Association. It is now reported that the Djakarta army order that banned activities of the PKI and its affiliates also requires Communist leaders at all levels in the Djakarta area to report to the police or military authorities. The Djakarta order omits from the ban the Communist labor affiliate, SOBSI. Possibly this is an attempt to discourage labor unrest, particularly in the critical area of food distribution.

3. Various reports indicate that the army is now beginning to press for the purge of Foreign Minister Subandrio. Army leaders are convinced of the Subandrio's complicity in the coup attempt.

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4. A Djakarta newspaper, controlled by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, yesterday published an editorial which implied Sukarno's responsibility for the current disorder. The article criticized Sukarno's shifting of the political balance in favor of the Communists and recommended that in the future Sukarno delegate more power and authority to others. The appearance of this editorial, inconceivable before 30 September, points out Sukarno's diminished stature.

5. Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Dani, who was deeply involved in the 30 September coup, left Indonesia yesterday, apparently to carry out a minor assignment in Europe. His departure fulfills only in part the army's demand for a cleanup of the air force.

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
19 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report # 35 - As of 4:00 P.M. EDT)

1. The possibility of serious clashes between Communist and non-Communist groups appears to be increasing. Anti-Communist elements in Sumatra seem intent on the complete destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its allied organizations. Moslem and other groups are now engaged in the systematic destruction of PKI offices and properties throughout Sumatra. Reports indicate that the army is directing and assisting in these activities while putting on a public show of following Sukarno's "no revenge" line.

2. There have been reports of the concentration of armed PKI cadres in northern Sumatra, a center of PKI strength, but so far anti-Communist forces appear to be encountering little effective opposition from the PKI. PKI forces in Java are also reportedly concentrating in a pro-Communist area of central Java and stockpiling rice and arms.



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4. The commander of the Celebes military area has followed the lead of the Djakarta military command in temporarily banning activities of the PKI and its affiliates.

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Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001500040035-4

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5. President Sukarno's attempt to exploit the Anti-Foreign Military Bases Conference, ending tomorrow in Djakarta, has been a failure. Despite an announcement that 500 delegates from 100 countries would attend the conference, only 186 delegates were present for Sukarno's opening address on 17 October. The US Embassy in Djakarta comments that the holding of this lackluster conference is further evidence of Indonesia's isolation from responsible world opinion.

6. New China News Agency (NCNA) on 19 October published a special roundup of developments in Indonesia. The full text of the roundup is not yet available; however the general tone appears to be extremely critical of developments in Indonesia since the 30 September coup attempt.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
18 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report # 34 - AS OF 4:00 P.M. EDT)

1. The commander of the Greater Djakarta military area has banned temporarily all activities of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), its youth, women, and peasant fronts, and four Communist student organizations in his jurisdiction. An earlier army decree had ordered all regional authorities to prohibit the activities of all political and mass organizations "clearly involved" in the 30 September movement, without citing specific groups. This may be the first direct step in the political elimination of the PKI.

2. Radio Djakarta has announced a meeting of all regional civil and military leaders to be held on 23 October. The leaders will gather in Djakarta to hear an "instruction" from President Sukarno. Sukarno will no doubt command them to restore order in their regions and quell further anti-Communist demonstrations.

3. The Indonesian government has not yet commented on Peking's charge that Indonesian troops in Djakarta broke into and searched the Communist Chinese commercial counselor's office last week end. The Chinese protest note delivered to the Indonesian embassy in Peking charged that "the Indonesian government has all along been condoning the increasingly unruly anti-Chinese activities." The note warned of serious consequences if the "anti-Chinese wave starting in Indonesia" is not checked. The US Embassy in Djakarta has received an unconfirmed report that the Chinese embassy is now evacuating its dependents.

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4. [REDACTED] Moslem groups in Medan and other north Sumatran cities are now burning the homes and other property of pro-Communist Chinese in the area. Despite the reported anti-Communist basis of this action, the Moslem attacks are probably as much motivated by general anti-Chinese feeling.

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5. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] According to press reports from Djakarta, slogans appeared in the city yesterday naming, for the first time, Subandrio as responsible along with Communist leaders for the coup attempt.

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OCI No. 2767/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
17 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #33 -- As of 4:00 P.M. EDT)

1. The army's demand for a purge of air force members involved in the coup attempt has been partially met with yesterday's announcement that leftist air force commander Marshal Dani would "temporarily" give up his duties and depart on an overseas mission. The US Embassy in Djakarta believes Dani is being sent to Communist China. The officer named as acting air force commander, however, is reportedly unacceptable to the army leadership as a permanent replacement for Dani.

2. President Sukarno today addressed the Anti-Foreign Bases Conference now being held in Djakarta. Despite speculation that he would make a major statement on the internal situation, Sukarno limited himself to standard attacks on the Imperialistic "Old Established Forces." In an apparent attempt to dramatize the conference, Radio Djakarta announced yesterday that the Indonesian air force has been flying reconnaissance missions over "enemy territory" in order "to observe imperialist activities and the possibility of an attack against Indonesia."

3. According to Djakarta press reports yesterday, the army has obtained Sukarno's agreement to continue a "state of war" in the Djakarta area. The army will undoubtedly use Sukarno's acquiescence in this matter to make further sweeps against the Communists.

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4. On 15 October, 26 journalists and officials of Antara, the left-leaning Indonesian national news agency, were arrested on suspicion of involvement in the 30 September coup attempt. Antara's operation was initially suspended following the coup attempt but resumed under army supervision.

5. The US Consulates in Surabaya and Medan have reported rising anti-PKI activity in those two cities. Yesterday Moslem mobs in Surabaya roamed the city tearing down PKI signs and attacking PKI members. [redacted] casualties were heavy. In Medan, Moslem and other anti-Communist groups burned the north Sumatra PKI headquarters on 15 October. An attempt by PKI members to defend the building reportedly resulted in heavy casualties.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
17 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #32 -- As of 4:00 P.M. EDT)

1. At the 16 October installation of General Suharto as army commander, President Sukarno stated that he needed "an atmosphere not set aflame from left and right" in order to "find a political solution." Sukarno termed the 30 September "incident" as merely "a ripple in the vast ocean of the Indonesian revolution."

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army believes that through continual agitation against the PKI, Sukarno will eventually accede to the army's wishes.

4. Various reports indicate that Sukarno, in an attempt to placate the army, may ban the PKI and replace it with a new "national" Communist party.

5. There is as yet no confirmation of the report that PKI chief Aidit was captured by the army on 14 October, although rumors to that effect are now circulating in Djakarta.

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
15 October 1965

State Dept. review completed

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report # 31 -- As of 4:00 P.M. EDT)

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3. A background briefing given three Western press correspondents by Second Deputy Foreign Minister Ganis Harsono seemed to reflect considerable confidence in his own position. Harsono in turn is dependent upon Subandrio--Foreign Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister--and upon Sukarno. Harsono gave the reporters a story, which the US Embassy says completely misrepresented the facts, of a mass rally on 28 September at which both Sukarno and Communist Party chairman Aidit spoke. The story, which is now being widely circulated, seems to be part of the continuing effort to portray Aidit as "anti-Indonesian" and to make him a major scapegoat for the 30 September affair.

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4. The Minister of Information told newspaper publishers on 15 October that "the present situation is not yet suitable for the president to take decisive steps. There is too much sentiment involved among the public."

5. General Nasution, Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces gave his blessing to the Anti-Foreign Military Bases Conference scheduled to open in Djakarta on 16 October. In a written message to a youth organization he said the campaign for the elimination of foreign military bases must be supported and expanded. His statement, possibly written before 1 October, was broadcast over the Djakarta Radio on 15 October presumably with army approval.

6. Mob activity in Indonesia took a new twist on 14 October with the destruction of the Chinese-controlled Res Public University in Djakarta. One Chinese student is reported to have been killed and numbers injured. Although the university was pro-Peking, the activity seems to have been as much or more anti-Chinese as anti-Communist. Minor instances of harassment of Chinese have been reported since 1 October but this is the first major instance of anti-Chinese activity.

7. Anti-Chinese sentiment is endemic in Indonesia, and anti-Chinese activity often accompanies a general rise in public excitement regardless of motivating circumstances. The Chinese Communist Embassy, rumored as a target for mob activity, is under a strong armored guard.

8. Probably in direct response to the destruction of Res Public University, one of the best equipped educational institutions in Indonesia, the Djakarta army commander on 15 October ordered a prohibition of property destruction. The army announcement stated that the people's anger in connection with the 30 September was understandable but that property destruction could not be condoned.

9. The army continues its drive against 30 September elements. It has ordered regional authorities to prohibit the activities of political and mass organizations clearly involved in the 30 September movement. Presumably these include the Communist youth and women's front organizations and possibly the peasant organization. Two other Communist-dominated youth groups were "frozen" several days ago.

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Indonesian Coup

Was a Red Bobble

*Ex-Ambassador Believes That PKI
Launched Coup Because It Felt
Its Time Was Running Out*

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT By Howard P. Jones

Chancellor of the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii, Jones was United States Ambassador to Indonesia from February, 1958, to last June. The Washington Post invited him to comment on developments at Djakarta because of his long experience there.

HONOLULU—Although the situation in Indonesia is still fluid and remains somewhat unclear, partly because communications with the outside world have not yet been completely restored, the picture that is beginning to emerge may be summarized as follows:

- An attempted coup d'etat was launched against President Sukarno and his government by a left-wing element led by Lt. Col. Untung, a relatively unknown battalion commander in the palace guard.

- The coup came within an inch of succeeding through the assassination of six of the top military command. It might well have succeeded had not Defense Minister Nasution and a number of other senior generals also marked for assassination acted fast in a dramatic counter-coup.

- The anticommunists, led by Gen. Nasution, are apparently in control as of this writing.

- President Sukarno is safe in his palace at Bogor, 40 miles from Djakarta. He has made one public appearance and two radio broadcasts urging his people to be calm and to cooperate in the restoration of order.

- The six top army generals assassinated, most of them anticommunists, were given heroes' funerals and Sukarno publicly condemned their slayers although he did not fix the blame on the Communists.

- The Indonesian cabinet denounced the killings, urged the need for an orderly atmosphere but did not condemn the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). It is noteworthy that the country's No. 2 and No. 3 Communists were at the meeting.

- Two days later, anticommunist demonstrators burned down the Communist headquarters in Djakarta. As they passed the American Embassy, a few of them yelled, "Long live America."

A Typical Explanation

THE FOREGOING summary leaves more questions unanswered than answered. The first unknown quantity is the circumstances that led up to the attempted coup.

Col. Untung attempted to explain his move in the first hours when it appeared that it might succeed. He accused Indonesian military leaders, who he said were working with the American CIA, of planning a coup against Sukarno Oct. 5, Armed Forces Day. It was essential for the left wing to get there first, was the gist of his story—typical Communist propaganda.

The alleged CIA plotting against Sukarno had been the theme of the Communist chorus for nearly a year before his resignation as Ambassador June 30. It was this baseless accusation that led to the threats against Bill Palmer, representative of the American motion picture industry in Indonesia, who was one of the best friends the country had.

The Communist press hounded him out of the country, dinning into the people's ears the charge that Palmer was the leader of the CIA in Indonesia and was involved in a conspiracy against the government. There was not one iota of truth in this or in the accusa-

tion that the CIA was working against Sukarno.

An American ambassador in a country is the representative of the President of the United States. Every agency of the United States Government within that country reports to him. This has been true for years, so I speak with authority on this point.

A Race for Succession

IF THE REASON given by Untung for the timing of the coup was specious, this leaves unanswered the question as to why the left-wing group chose that particular moment to attempt a coup. The real story may never be known, but it might not be too far fetched to reason as follows:

President Sukarno was 64 on June 6. At various times in recent years, he has been reported in ill health. It was no secret in Djakarta that the race for succession was on.

The PKI leaders were known to be fearful of the moment when Sukarno would step off the stage. At that point, a struggle for power between the PKI and the Indonesian military appeared inevitable, with the military having the bigger muscles.

Some six months ago Aidit, the Communist boss in Indonesia, called for arming of the peasants and workers to resist the British-Malaysian military forces defending Malaysia against Indonesian threats. Aidit, of course, was preparing for the moment when he would have to fight for the power he seeks.

There have been recent reports that Sukarno was ailing again, although I have no idea how accurate they may be. Newspaper correspondents said he was his usual ebullient self in his public

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
8 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report # 24 -- As of 4:00 P.M. EDT)

1. The army appears to be reluctantly accepting Sukarno's position that there be no major punitive action against the Communists. Apparently it plans to use the situation, however, to strengthen army contacts with the general population and to justify a cleansing of the army and civil defense organizations of Communist elements.
2. Defense Minister General Nasution has ordered the chief of civil defense and people's defense headquarters to order every echelon from the provincial level down to ward and neighborhood associations to rid itself of elements who directly or indirectly were involved in the 30 September movement. Civil defense and people's defense are ordered to accept "spontaneous elements" from among the community who desire to assist the armed forces to restore security. Local civil and people's defense officers are urged to maintain constant contact with military commanders.
3. SOKSI, an army-sponsored labor organization, has adopted a resolution appealing to Sukarno, to create immediately a "fifth force" composed of people who were not involved in the counter-revolutionary 30 September movement. SOKSI's suggestion refers to the proposal by Sukarno, first raised several months ago and strongly endorsed by the Communists, that a fifth force of worker and peasant volunteers be formed and armed.
4. Sukarno, for his part, apparently is moving to counter the army's local activity. The Central Board of the National Front has scheduled a national meeting of regional chapters on 13 October. The National Front is

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an official multi-level organization, largely Communist-dominated, to which Sukarno has frequently assigned agit-prop tasks. The Central Board has requested each province except Central Java to send one representative to the meeting. Central Java, however, has been asked to send representatives from the subprovincial areas of Jogjakarta, Magelang, and Semarang--all Communist centers.

5. Dependents of the embassy staff are being quietly evacuated from Djakarta by commercial aircraft.

NOTE: Hereafter this publication will be issued only at 4:00 P.M. It has been found that the 6:00 A.M. edition more or less duplicates the article on the same situation in the CIB, and incoming traffic usually does not warrant an 11:00 A.M. edition.

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Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001500040019-2

OCI No. 2759/65

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
7 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation

(Report #19 - As of 6:00 AM EDT)

1. The apparent stalemate between Sukarno and the army leadership continues. Djakarta itself is peaceful with General Suharto's forces in complete control, and almost all of Indonesia remains outwardly calm. Some limited dissidence continues in Central Java, but army leaders in Djakarta apparently do not consider it a threat to their control.
2. No significant trends were indicated at the cabinet meeting which Sukarno held on 6 October--the US Embassy in Djakarta had earlier suggested that the meeting would be the key turning point indicating the extent to which Sukarno will be able to resume control. M. H. Lukman and Nojoto, who rank second and third in the PKI, reportedly attended the meeting but PKI Chairman Aidit has still not been heard from.
3. Earlier reports that Air Marshal Dani had been placed under "protective custody" by the army were apparently dispelled by his presence at the cabinet session. Since announcing the arrest of several Halim Air Force base personnel suspected of being involved in the "30 September Movement," Dani has issued an ultimatum giving air force rebels 72 hours to surrender or be "hunted down and severely dealt with." This action is almost certainly a further attempt by Dani to disassociate the air force command from its initial involvement in the coup.

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4. A public statement from the PKI Central Committee (dated 5 October) is apparently being suppressed by the army. The statement is the first official PKI comment on the "30 September Movement" since Suharto took control. It states that after careful study the CC-PKI fully supports the message of President Sukarno and believes that the "30th September Movement was an internal army matter and the CC-PKI did not participate in it." Events of the past seven days have put the PKI and pro-Communist elements on the defensive and there is almost a complete communications breakdown within the party.

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OCI No. 2804/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
6 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report # 18 - As of 4:00 P.M. EDT)

1. No basic decisions apparently were forthcoming at President Sukarno's cabinet meeting at Bogor Palace on 6 October. Sukarno appears determined to re-establish his authority by: (1) preventing the army from acting decisively against the PKI and suspected leaders of the "30 September Movement," an action that would prevent Sukarno from playing off these elements against the army as he has done in the past; and (2) re-establishing a working relationship between these two hostile forces and restoring unity to the country by warning of a serious external threat, but without specifically identifying the enemy.

2. The whereabouts of D. N. Aidit, PKI Chairman, is still unknown, and most of the PKI leadership has gone underground.

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3. Despite Sukarno's refusal to ban the PKI and order the seizure of the suspected conspirators, there are indications that the army is not as submissive as it has been in the past. Armed Communists in Djakarta have been imprisoned and Communist youth front members are being rounded up. Njono, Chief of the Djakarta PKI Committee and former head of SOBSI, the PKI-led labor federation, reportedly has been arrested.

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4. There continue to be reports of minor skirmishing in central Java, where remnant anti-government forces are concentrated. While in control of Jojakarta earlier in the week, rebel forces reportedly massacred the wife and eight children of Colonel Karin, Commander of the Jojakarta military district.

5. It was announced by Djakarta radio today that the five-year old daughter of General Nasution had died of gun shot wounds inflicted by the "30 September movement."

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OCI No. 2757/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
6 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #17 - As of 11:00 AM EDT)

1. President Sukarno talked briefly with news reporters this morning prior to a plenary cabinet session. The meeting with the press obviously had been planned to counter speculation that Sukarno was too ill to make a public appearance. He refused to make a press statement, but stood or walked about before the newsmen. First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio pointedly commented, "Here, you see the president healthy."
2. After the cabinet meeting, Subandrio gave a statement to the press detailing the course of the session. From Subandrio's account, Sukarno apparently made an effort to conciliate all factions, play down the importance of recent events, and to return the nation's attention to the idea of an external threat. He denounced the killing of the six generals in what he termed the 30 September "incident," did not justify the creation of Untung's "Revolution Council," accepted the necessity for action against elements "from all groups" who had taken part in the "incident" but called for an orderly atmosphere and a peaceful settlement. He noted that commander of the air force Marshal Dani had reported on the arrest of a number of instructors of men and women volunteers at the Halim Air Force base believed to have been involved in the 30 September incident. He stated that neither he nor the prophet Mohammed in the course of much experience had given precedence to revenge.

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3. Sukarno urged again that divisive feelings and accusations be avoided since division in Indonesia's political life could only benefit the neocolonialists and imperialists. He said that the enemy is near us and that if the Indonesian revolution is disrupted, NEKOLIM (neocolonialist-imperialist) threats would become realities.

4. The army is reported to have imprisoned 200 armed Communists in Djakarta and to have rounded up members of the Communist youth front who have received military training.

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OCI No. 2755/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
5 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #13 - As of 6:00 AM EDT)

1. Army leaders are reportedly outraged by the killing of six top generals by members of the pro-Communist "30 September Movement." They deeply resent Sukarno's continuing refusal to sanction a crackdown on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). There is also considerable suspicion in Indonesian official circles that Sukarno was personally involved in the plotting. The US Embassy in Djakarta has noted unfirmed reports that Sukarno suffered a heart attack during the morning of 2 October.

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3. The PKI, for its part, appears to be going underground. Some Communists have expressed complete hopelessness unless Sukarno uses his political magic to salvage the party. PKI Chairman Aidit may be in hiding, probably in Central Java.

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State Dept. review completed

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4. The US Embassy in Djakarta has offered its estimate of the current situation. The Embassy said, "on balance, we believe that Sukarno will retain office (if his health permits) but with his hold on the rein of power weakened." For the army leaders, the Embassy concludes, "it's now or never."

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OCI No. 2753/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesia Situation
(Report #10 - As of 6:00 A.M. EDT)

1. The situation remains relatively calm throughout most of Indonesia. President Sukarno has rejected suggestions of firm measures against leaders of the "30 September Movement" and the PKI. He told the army generals to "leave the political settlement to me." Sukarno has always maintained his own power by balancing competing forces and is apparently now seeking a restoration of the status quo which existed prior to the coup.

2. In Sukarno's two, very brief pre-recorded speeches on 2 and 3 October, however, it was not clear whether Sukarno was speaking with complete freedom or not. The statements were terse and the tone was one of anger. US Ambassador Green reports that the speeches "make Sukarno sound like a man in trouble." The question seems to be whether Suharto's forces will move against the PKI despite whatever moves and statements Sukarno may make in attempting to stop them. 25X1

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Some such action is apparently in the preparation stage and the army has already taken over control of the PKI press facilities in Djakarta. 25X1

State Dept. review completed

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OCI No. 2754/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #11 - As of 1100 EDT)

The death of the six Indonesian generals, including Army Commander Yani, has been announced. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The funeral for the generals will be held on 5 October, and the annual Armed Forces Day parade on that date has been cancelled. Sukarno has decreed seven days of mourning.

The general whereabouts of most military and civilian leaders seems to have been established. General Suharto and his colleagues apparently are moving freely between Djakarta and Bogor where President Sukarno seems to be. Relatively little has been heard from or about Defense Minister Nasution. He is reported in Djakarta and may be advising Suharto and others. A recorded address by Nasution to the armed forces which was broadcast on 4 October makes no mention of recent events and probably was taped several days ago.

[REDACTED] First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio returned to Djakarta from North Sumatra on 3 October and is now in Bogor with Sukarno. Air Force Commander Marshall Dani, who initially supported Lt. Col. Untung's coup, on 4 October broadcast his thanks to the president and people "for trust in the air force" and says appropriate action will be taken against any air force personnel involved in the "30 September movement."

Sukarno has called a cabinet meeting for 6 October in Bogor. Attendance may help clarify the status of top government officials.

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The army continues to hold that the Communist Party was involved, either directly or through its youth front, in Untung's coup. The large Moslem party, Nahdatul Ulama, and three small parties have issued a joint declaration blaming the Communists for the "30 September movement." It urged the banning of Communist front organizations and of newspapers which "had clearly served as voices of counterrevolutionaries or had tended to side with them."

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The Communist Party itself is quiet throughout Indonesia.

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OCI No. 2751-65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
3 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #9 - As of 4:00 PM EDT)

The situation within Djakarta appears under control, although armed Communist elements are reported to be at large in the city. Djakarta area commander General Umar has ordered civilians to turn in all arms on penalty of death. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Umar's order appears designed to force a showdown with the Communists. Umar is also reported to have banned the Djakarta Communist newspaper, Harian Rakjat.

The situation appears quiet in most other areas, but is reported as "delicate" in Central Java. Here troops in several areas reportedly continue to support the rebels; however, only Djogjakarta appears to remain in rebel control. There has been no evidence of any significant clashes.

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[REDACTED] Sukarno has called for unity,

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absolved the air force of complicity, and still has given no indication that he intends to deal harshly with the leaders of the 30 September Movement.

Thus far, Peiping has not mentioned the Indonesian coup and counter-coup. Moscow has merely reported developments as they have appeared in the Western press.

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PROVIDENCE, R.I.
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Time for Us to Play It Cool in Indonesia

When he heard that an Indonesian mob had burned down the Communist headquarters in Jakarta and that other mobs in the Indonesian capital were continuing to demonstrate against Communism, a shrewd local observer commented the other day:

"That's fine, but I wish they would stop shouting 'Long live America.'"

He's got a point.

It is a hopeful and refreshing change to find the people of Jakarta up in arms against Communism for a change. This is the same city where a U.S. library has been sacked and where even the residence of the American ambassador has not been adequately protected against Communist-led mobs.

This sudden change of mood seems to confirm the wisdom of the patience displayed by former U.S. Ambassador to Jakarta, Howard P. Jones, who even on the darkest

days retained his faith in ultimate U.S.-Indonesian friendship and who persevered in attempting to build areas of understanding between our two countries long after most Americans had written off Indonesia and its volatile leader, President Sukarno, as lost to communism.

It appears that Mr. Jones was right when he argued that there was strong anti-Communist and anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia and that the Indonesian army was a powerful counterweight to the strong Indonesian Communist Party.

There is some cause for cautious rejoicing.

But we should be wary, as the before-mentioned observer is wary, of Indonesians shouting pro-American slogans. Indonesians on the whole, we suspect, aren't pro anything except Indonesia. That has been the chief cause of the Communist downfall—in so far as the

Communists have fallen—and not any strong affection for the United States or for the economic system we espouse. Indonesian's got fed up with their Communists who acted for China's—not Indonesia's—interests.

Indonesians who go about shouting pro-American slogans as though they were working for the CIA, which some of them may be doing, are only going to draw nationalistic ire upon themselves as the Peking-loving Communists have done.

This is a time for Americans to play it cool in Indonesia. The Indonesians who can beat the Communists—who aren't beaten yet, by a long shot—are Indonesians who aren't for anybody but Indonesia. After what the United States has been through in that unhappy republic in recent years, this kind of parochial patriot, beholden to no foreigner, ought to be friend enough.

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OCI No. 2801/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
5 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #14 - As of 11:00 A.M. EDT)

1. The US Embassy in Djakarta estimates that the Indonesian Army must now act quickly if it is to exploit its opportunity to move against the PKI. While Sukarno has not regained full control of the situation, his limited public statements indicate his desire to save the PKI and its Air Force allies. The Army is now strongly pressing its case against the Communists. Its ability to stand fast, however, in the face of Sukarno's attempts to mesmerize it, as in the past, is in doubt. Sukarno remains in his palace at Bogor, meeting periodically with Army leaders.

2. The major pressure for a crackdown on the PKI appears to be coming from West Java military commander Maj. General Adjie. [REDACTED]

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3. The US Consulate in Surabaya reports that the central Java city of Jogjakarta, earlier in rebel hands is now controlled by the Army. Rebel strength throughout central Java is apparently dwindling rapidly.

4. A funeral service for the six assassinated generals was held today in Djakarta. General Nasution, in his first public appearance since the coup attempt, delivered a rather low-keyed funeral oration.

State Dept. review completed

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OCI No. 2750/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
3 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Indonesian Situation
(Report #8 - As of 11:00 A.M. EDT)

1. President Sukarno's authority has been reasserted, and the situation in Djakarta and most of Indonesia appears calm. In a conference at Bogor palace on 2 October, Sukarno appointed the leftist Major General Pranoto administrative Chief of the army and Major General Suharto operational commander.

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2. According to the chief of the greater Djakarta command all forces of Lt. Col. Untung have surrendered, although Untung himself has evaded capture and is reported to be in Surakarta, Central Java with Col. Suherman, leader of dissident forces which are still apparently fighting in that area. In central Java the commanding general of the Diponegoro Division has declared his loyalty to the government and his opposition to the "30 September Movement." Pledges of support for Sukarno and opposition to the "30 September Movement" have come in from numerous military and civilian leaders.

3. According to unconfirmed reports, all army leaders taken captive by the "30 September Movement" including army chief Yani were killed, with the possible exception of General Parman.

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The Charade in Indonesia

POOR COMMUNICATIONS and contradictory reports leave us in the dark about what really is happening in Indonesia.

If President Sukarno is out, or on the way out, or even has had his wings clipped, that would be welcome news. But the one worse thing than Sukarno which might happen to Indonesia would be a take-over by Communism with Red China calling the shots.

IT MAY BE several days before we get anything like an accurate rundown. But as we do, two men bear watching:

One is Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Subandrio. He leans a little more to the left—Peking variety—than Sukarno, which is saying a lot. One early report said Subandrio was among the top men in the "revolutionary council" formed after the first coup. That would seem to label the coup as Communist.

Second man to watch is Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, armed forces commander who consistently has been anti-Communist. If, as later reports indicated, Nasution had successfully led a counter-coup, then the Communist revolution has not yet come to Indonesia.

This suggests Sukarno is likely to carry on, since Nasution has always deferred to the old play-boy "revolutionist" who led his country to independence from the Dutch. We can only hope that Sukarno doesn't quite make it back in view of what he has done with his country's independence.

MEANWHILE, TWO thoughts about direct American interest.

One is the good news that all U.S. nationals are safe in Jakarta and elsewhere. Indeed, they appear to be considerably safer than the American libraries which have been burned in recent months. Obviously those anti-American mob outbursts were triggered by Sukarno in line with his "go to hell with your aid" stance. The fact that Americans haven't been molested strongly hints that Sukarno lost the reins at least for a while.

Second thought is the absurdity of the Indonesian radio charge that our Central Intelligence Agency was instrumental in the first uprising by the "council of generals."

The State Department's prompt denial of this was hardly necessary. With this country up to our ears in a war in Vietnam—which we aren't winning yet—would we be likely to involve ourselves in starting another one in Indonesia?